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Abstract
There are two sectors: a traditional goods sector with perfect competition among
tinns and a high-lech diflcrcntiated goods sector with imperfect competition. Firms in the
latter sector engage in RBcD, which is an in-house activity. There are no externalities.
Oligopolistic competition in the differentiated goods sector differs with respect to
toughness. Tough competition induces relatively low profit margins, a relatively small
number of firms in long-run equilibrium and a relatively fast rate of growth. The welfare
consequences of different market solutions are analysed by comparing the outcomes with
those of a planning approach. In the market solutions consumers maximize an intertempo-
ral utility function. In the centralized solution the planning authority takes this function as
the objective to be maximized.
JEL code: 110,620i
Introduction
In the new growth theory the rate of efficiency improvement is endogenous. Techno-
logical change is fed by learning effects or is related to RBcD activities. The latter type of
analysis has to be more specific. RdcD activities can be directed at the invention of new
products or at the realization of new techniques of production. In most models it is
assumed that RBcD activities generate in addition to the specific knowledge aimed at also
a more general form of knowlegde, which is is publicly available (e.g. Romer, 1990,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991). RBcD induces externalities, which improve the existing
knowledge base in the laboratories, so that the productivity of factors employed in
research is improved. This generates a steady path of economic growth.
In this paper we discuss the implications of RBcD in a somewhat different setting. It
is assumed that RBcD-activities besides special knowledge for the purpose intended create
additional knowledge, which is internal to the firm and is used in subsequent RBcD
activities. These ideas correspond with empirical work stressing that firms rely on tacit
knowledge and firm-specific skills (e.g. Pavitt, 1984; Dosi, 1988). Therefore growth in
our approach relies on internalities instead of on externalities.
It is by now well-known, that firms engaging in RBcD need profits to pay for the
fixed cost involved. Succes in RBcD may create partial monopoly position which can be
exploited. Assuming free entry in RBcD, an equilibrium may then be established, showing
that the present value of these monopoly profits equals the cost of RBcD output (blueprints
for new technologies). Here we assume that firms have their own niche in the market
which allows them to pay for traditional fixed cost as well as for RBcD outlays. In the
short-run firms may make profits in excess of these fixed cost or incur losses. In the
long-run free entry and exit drives these excess net profits down to zero. The number of
firms in the innovating industry is, therefore, endogenous. In this respect our model is
similar in spirit to that of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). There are however important
differences as these authors assume homogeneity of products in the high-tech sector and
ignore the investment aspect of outlays on RBcD.
The assumptions made allow us to study differences in the toughness of competition
in relation to economic growth. If the number of firms in the initial situation is relatively
small, as may be realistic in high-tech sector, firms face oligopolistic competition. If
competition is tough profit margins are based on the own price elasticities of demand. ln
a situation with soft competition, firms take the impact of their price level on market
demand for the sector as a whole into account in setting mark-ups. To allow for this
possibility we have to introduce a second sector in addition to the high-tech industry on
which the analysis is focussed. The second sector produces traditional goods, without
engaging in RBcD. For this reason it can be assumed that perfect competition prevails in
the traditional goods sector.







in a market equilibrium. There are less firms the tougher the competition is. Relatively
tough competition leaves morc room for allocating labour to RBcD in each firm. As a
result thc macroeconomic growth rate will be higher.
Apart from comparing both market solutions we discuss the welfare implications of
each of them. For this purpose we start with the planning solution of the model, which
can be solved analytically. Competition à la Chamberlin with profit margins detertnined
by the elasticity of substitution in the high-tech sector will be considered next. In
addition, we derive results for the case in which profit margins are based on the full
impact of price changes on demand for the firm's products. The differences between the
solutions of the model are illustrated by a numerical example.
Feasible growth paths
There are two sectors in the economy. In the sector denoted by Y, firms produce
traditional goods. In the sector denoted by X, each firm produces a differentiated product.
Labour is the only production factor in the economy. By allocating labour to RBcD, firms
in the X-sector can raise labour productivity, so that the X-sector may be referred to as
the high-tech sector. Consumers have a taste for goods from the traditional and from the
high-tech sector. Moreover, consumers trade-off future consumption for present consump-
tion.
Denoting per capita utility by U and per capita consumption by C, the intertemporal
preference function can be specified as
m
U-~ 1 1 p L.`-a e~r dr (I)
Equation ( I) is a CRRA utility function with a constant pure rate of time preference B and
a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution llp. The consumption index C in defined
as
C-X"Y~-" 0 c a c 1 (2)
where X denotes the index of production in the high-tech sector which is given by
E
!V f-1 e -1
X - ~ x~ ` e ~ 1 (3)
fti
There are N producers of differentiated products x~. These products are imperfect
substitutes with constant elasticities of substitution e. Equations ( 1) -(3) taken together
specify consumers preferences with respect to products and with respect to the time of
consumption of these products.
Production of traditional goods requires one unit of labour, so that total production of3
Y equals
Y - Ly (4)
where Ly denotes the amount of labour allocated in the Y-seetoc Production of a
differentiated product (i) requires l~h units of labour:
x; - h; L,.; (S)
where LX; denotes the amount of labour applied in producing product x;. Innovation in
each firm (i) requires labour L,; to improve labour productivity h according to the formula
h; - ~ h; L,; (6)
where ~ is a constant parameter. The introduction of h; on the RHS of eq. (ti) captures
the idea that knowledge creation is a cumulative process which feeds on existing knowled-
ge. By assuming constant returns with respect to ezisting knowledge h;, productivity
growth can be sustained in the long run by allocating a constant amount of labour to RBcD
activities. Accumulation of knowledge is an in-house activity of each firm. It is here
assumed that in-house knowledge can be kept secret. However, as shown in another paper
the analysis can be enriched by allowing for knowledge spillovers between firms.'~
Firms in the high-tech sector incur traditional fixed cost in the form of a fixed
amount of labour, f. The total amount of labour available in the economy, L, is fixed and
should equal total labour demand. Assuming symmetry across firms in the differentiated
products sector we can write:
LyfN(Lx; fL,; f~-L
Growth paths which satisfy equations (I) -(~ are called feasible. Which path is
selected depends upon institutional arrangements. First, we consider the case where a
planning authority maximizes the utility of the representative consumer. Secondly, market
solutions will be analysed under different assumption with respect to the behaviour of the
partial monopolist in the high-tech sector. The welfare implications of the market
solutions are discussed by comparing the results with the outcomes of the centralized
solution.
't S.x SmulJers and Van de Klundert (1993).4
The planning approach
In a planning approach the central authority maximizes eq. (1) subject to eq. (2) -
(7). Because of the symmetry in the differentiated products sector it may be stated without
proof that in the optimum production volumes of all differentiated products are equal to x.
Instead of eq. (3) we may therefore write,
E
X - Nf-f X (3a)
Substitution of the constraints in the objective function and taking proper account of the
accumulation eq. (6) gives rise to the Hamiltonian expression:
H- 1 J(~i(F -!I hLX~a(1-v1 '~ - ly(Lx t L, t~,(! -o1(1-O)1 t~~hLr
Í -p l 1
where w denotes the costate variable associated with state variable h. The instruments,
which have to be chosen optimally, are N, Lx and L,. The first order conditions with
respect to these instruments can be written after some manipulations as
L - (e -1)(I -a) L
y (e-IJ t a
NLs- ÍaaLy
s~ - (1 - aJ C! -c N
( h f ~Ly l
l 1
Optimizing with respect to the state variable yields
(C! -P
~v - B~v - -a I h - ~L.~
The corresponding transversality condition reads:






From eq. (8) and (9) it follows that Ly and LX s NLX are constant. There is no growth in
the traditional sector. Substitution of these result in the labour market equation (~ gives
an expression for L,. Applying the definition for the growth rate of labour productivity
g - h - ~L~ one finds:S
~a L
x- (e -I) f a Íy
-~f
Logarithmic differentiation of eq. (10) with respect to time yields
to - (1 -p) C R { N
(13)
(14)
The growth rate of aggregate consumption can be found by logarithmic differentiation of
eq. (2) after subsituting X- ~yt~tE -U1iLA and noting that Ly and Lx are constant:
C a IV } a~ (IS)
C - (f-1) N
Equations (I1), (14) and ( IS) can be combined to yield the following differential equation
in N:
N - a(p -I)f - BI~ N (e -1)aL (16)
- [a(p-I)I(E-I) - I - (E-I) t a
Equation (16) has a positive root. The planning authority should therefore opt for a
constant value of N. Otherwise N gces to infinity or will become negative. Both possibili-
ties must be excluded on logical grounds. With N fixed the growth rate is constant as
appears from eq. (13). The optimal number of firms can be obtained from eq. (16) by
setting N - p.
N. -(pa t 1 - a) - e, aL (1~
a(v -1)f - 91í; (e-I) t a
Substitution of this solution in eq. ( 13) results in the optimal rate of growth of labour
productivity in the high-tech sector:
g ~ - (E -I)~j - 9 (IÓ)
(Pa . I - a) -E
As can easily be shown the transversality condition (12) is satisfied for B 1(1 - p)ag,
which implies f~ g~(p - 1)a~ . Economic meaningful solutions for 1~ and g~ then
require (p - 1)a ~ e- I and f~ gl(E -IJ~. The latter two inequalities imply the former
and are therefore necessary conditions for a meaningful solution of the optimization
problem. Note that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution should be smaller than unity
(p 1 1). With constant Y, N and Lx the growth rate of consumption can be found by
logarithmic differentiation of eq. (12): ~~C - ag' .
The optimal rate of growth is negaiivety related to the pure rate of time preference
(B) and pnsitively related to the productivity of the RBcD sector (í:), the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (I~p~, the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products
(e) and the size of fixed cost (n. The impact of the first three parameters needs no further6
explanation. The intuition behind a rise in e or f is tha[ these changes make variety less
attractive, so that the optimal number of firms declines. As a result more labour can be
allocated in the remaining differentiated product sectors. Profits can be raised by
increasing the amount of each good produced or by investing in productivity improve-
ments. Starting from an optimum it pays to do both, because a rise in production (and
therefore in revenue) makes RBcD more attractive.
Decentralized solutions
In a market economy consumers maximize the intertemporal utility function and
producers maximize the value of the firm. Prices of high-tech products are set by
monopolists, while other prices and the rate of interest are determined under the conditi-
ons of perfect competition. All markets clear. On the capital market firms issue securities
which are bought by households. There is no investment in physical capital goods. Firms
invest in knowledge capital and use the returns to pay shareholders a dividend. Sharehol-
ders in their turn supply savings which firms need to invest.
Consumers behaviour can be formulated as a two stage budgeting problem. [n the
first stage, consumers decide upon the path of aggregate consumption over time by
maximizing (l) subject to the dynamic budget constant
~, - r~ A, . w~ - C,P~, (19)
where A, r, w and P~ denote non-human wealth, the rate of interest, the wage rate and
the consumption price index respectively. From the first order conditions one can obtain
by routine calculation (time subscripts are now omitted for simplification)
~ - (r - P~IP~ - B
(20)
C p
This is the well-known Ramsey-rule saying that households smooth consumption over
time. If the real interst rate exceeds the pure rate of time preference it pays to save. In
the opposite case households dissave.
In the second stage of the decision problem consumers maximize eq. (2), taking
accuunt uf cy. ({), subjcct tu thc budgct constrainl
XPX f YPy - CP~ (21)
From the first order conditions one can then derive the demand equations
X - X ~Px~l -a
J PxJ
(22)Y - (1 -aJ
CP~
Py
Substitution of these equations in the utility function yields the price indices
N ~
I -r Í -r
Px - ~ p.~;
j:i
PC - r ax~a r1Pallro
Perfect competition prevails in the Y-sector, so that price equals cost
(23)
(24)
Py - w (2G)
Producers in the high-tech sector maximize the value of the firm by setting prices and
choosing the amount of RBcD to be performed. For the present value of the firm we may
write
v- I ~-Cjr Pxjr -~xjr ' Lrjr t.i~ w~ ~ e'R(~) !1! (27Í
tl ~
where R(rJ -~ r(s) ds denotes the discount factor. Maximization of eq. (27) subject to
the constraints (5), (6) and (22) yields after some algebraic manipulations
Pxj
ej w






( Pj-1 ~ 30
Pxjl ~xj ' PIj~ ~rj ' l~bj - r Phj O ej
where ej is the perceived price elasticity of demand and phj denotes the shadow price of a
unit of RBcD output (product-specific knowledge or blueprints). Equation (28) implies that
firms set a fixed mark-up over cost. The perceived price elasticity can be derived from
equations (22) and (24) as
e - e t (v -I)(e -1) xXpx~ (31)
x
The parameter u is introduced to capture the toughness of competition is the high-tech
sector. Only polar cases u- 0 and u- I will be considered. If u- J competition is8
relatively tough so that firms may only consider the demand effects of changes in their
own relative price: e- e. This is the assumption usually made in the Chamberlin model
of monopolistic competition. lf u- 0 firms take into account also the demand effect of a
change in the aggregate price index of high-tech goods, because competition is relatively
soft. The impact of a firm's price change on the aggregate index depends upon the market
share, which equals IIN in case of symmetry. With competition being soft the elasticity of
demand, e- e-(e -1)IN. is lower than in the standard Chamberlinian model and firms
are able to realize higher mark-ups. We will reserve the term monopolistic competition
for the latter case and speak of Chamberlinian competition if the perceived price elasticity
equals e.2~
Equation (29) implies that the marginal product of labour employed in RBcD in value
terms I;hp~~ should be equated to the marginal cost of labour w. Equation (30) is a no
arbitrage condition, saying that investing an amount of money p~~ in the capital market
(RHS) should yield the same revenue as investing that same amount of money in
knowledge production. The latter raises productivity in producing commodities and hence
revenue (first term LHS), it raises the knowledge base in RBr.D activities (second term)
and it yields a capital gain (last term).
Assuming symmetry in the high-tech sector, labour market equilibrium is given by
eq. (7). In the appendix it is shown that under perfect foresight of agents the allocation of
labour across sectors and firms is constant over time. The system jumps to a steady state
growth equilibrium as [here are no historical determined rigidities. Labour productivity in
the high-tech sector grows at a constant rate, g. Under these circumstances the shadow
price of blueprints, p~,, will be constant too. As appears from eq. (29), wages rise at the
same rate as labour productivity in the high-tech sector. The price of good Y increases at
the rate g.
Substitution of eq. (28) in eq. (29), taking account of eq. (6) and p~ - p, results in
L,~ - rr R gl L,~ (32)
The ratio of Iabour in RBcD activities to labour in direct production is higher the higher is
the equilibrium growth rate and the Iower is the equilibrium rate of interest. For a
meaningful solution we must have r~ g. As will be shown below, this condition will be
met if the same inequality restrictions on parameters are postulated as in the planning
approach.
Equations (2) -(7), (23) -(26), (28) and (32) can be applied to derive the rate of
return, r, in terms of the equilibrium growth rate, g:
r-~ r(e-1)al rL - j.l } e(1 -a)
8
L e-a J LN JI e-o
(33)
'-~ See also Yang and Htijdro (1993).9
Eq. (33) will be labeled the TecHnology line and is shown in Figure 1. The rate of return
depends posiNvely on the productivity of RBcD (Q), the availability of labour (~~N~, and
the taste for high-tech goods (o). The rate of return depends negarively on the amount of
fixed cost (n. The TECtt-line has a positive slope. A rise in the growth rate implies an
increase in fixeci cost for RBcD. Profits fall, but as a part (1 - a) of profits is spent on the
consumption of Y-goods, this leakage declines and sales and retums in the differentiated
goods sector increase.
The required rate of retum by households follows from rewriting the Ramsey
condition (20), noting that in the steady state ~!C - ag and p~IP~ -(I -o)g.
r- 9 f(pa f I- a18 (34)
This relation is depicted by de PREFerence line in Figure 1. The relation between the
required reward on savings (r) and the growth rate is positive for two reasons. First,
marginal utility is declining in consumption (p ~ O), intertemporal subsitution is
imperfect. Households intend to smooth consumption over time unless they are compensa-
ted by a high rate of return on savings. They ask a rate of return with a premium of pag
for postponement of consumption. Second, marginal utility is declining in X for a constant
level of Y, intertemporal substitution between X and Y is imperfect. Households ask a
premium of (I - a)g to be compensated for the loss in utility if the X-component in
aggregate consumption grows at a rate ~~.
Insert Figure I
The equilibrium rate of growth for a given number of differentiated products is found
at the intersection of the TECtt-line and PReF-line, as shown in Figure l. It is assumed
here Ihat the slope of Ihe PREF-line is steeper than that oftherECH-line: pa t 1-a ~ e(1-a)I(e -o)
which condition holds for p~ 1. The solution for the rate of growth is
~ - ~ó(LIN -,f) - B (35)
po r S-a
where b - (e-!)a~(e-o). The growth rate depends negu~ively on the pure rate of time
preference (B), the amount of fixed cost (~ and the number of Rrms (N). The growth rate
depends posirively on productivity of RBcD (i;), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(]~p) and the size of the economy (L).
Assuming free entry and exit of firms in the differentiated goods sector eq. (35) does
not represent a long-run equilibrium, because profits (losses) will in general differ from10
zero. Positive profits induce tirms to enter.
To simplify the dynamics we assume that enrrants can start producing with the same
technology as rncumben~s. Losses lead to exit of incumbents until a zero profit situation is
realized. In the long run the number of firms in the differentiated goods sector is
endogenous and can be derived from the zero profit condition xp~ - (LX t L, f~ w- 0.
The number of firms depend on the rate of growth according to the implicit relation
IV - e(8 aL~ (36)
Equations (33),(34) and (36) can be solved for N, g and r. Let us consider the case
of competition à la Chamberlin (e - e) first. Substitution of eq. (36) in eq. (33) gives the
no-entry rate of return
r- e (8 -F ~'if
Insert Figure 2
The NO-ENTRY curve is shown in Figure 2 together with the PREF line. At the point of
intersection one finds the solutions for r and g
(e -1)~j-B
g-po.(1 -aJ-e
r - IPa t (1 -o)I (e -I)~j - e9
pa t (I-a) -e
The solution for N is obtained by substituting eq. (38) into eq. (36):
(38)
(39)
N - (P o . ! - a) - e aL (~)
(p - I)af - BI~ e
Economic meaningful results are obtained under the same conditions as in the
centralized solution: pa t 1- a~ e and f~ BI(e-1)~. As can be easily checked these
incqualities imply p~ I and r ~ g. The condition pa f 1- u 1 e can be interpreted as
a stability condition. It implies that the No-ENTRY curve cuts the Ramsey curve from
above. Now suppose that this condition is violated and we are in a situation with a
number of firms higher than in the long-run equilibrium so that the rate of growth is
lower than in equilibrium. The short-run solution lies then above the No-ENTRY line and
firms realize positive profits. Free entry will lead to a larger number of firms. Hence11
firms in the high-tech sector receive less revenue to cover fixed cost. Profits fall and
there is an incentive to cut RBcD outlays on balance. This leads to a rise in profits and a
further increase in the number of firms if e ~ pa f I- a. A relative large price elasticity
induces small price reductions if output increase under impact of a reallocation of labour
from RBcD to production. The rate of interest dces not fall much if g declines and po f
(J - a) is small. So, there is no strong incentive to raise RBcD activities. The stability
condition is an example of a more general condition called DSD (downwazd sloping
demand) by Novshek and Sonnenschein (1987). The DSD-condition, which gces back to
Walras, implies that in a full Arrow-Debreu equilibrium additional entry leads to new
input and output prices at which the entrants make a loss. Here the DSD-condition is
satisfied if the NO-ENTRY line cuts the Ramsey curve from above. The condition on f
shows that these fixed cost are essential in the model.
Next, we consider the case of monopolistic competition with P- E-(E -IJIN.
Substitution of this price clasticity in cq. (36) yicWs
N - aL~ t e-1
E(x t ~~ E
The No-ENTRV condition can then be obtained by substitution of eq. (41) into eq. (33)
(41)
E(~ ' ~ - ~ (42) r-
I f (e -1)(g tï~I~aL
The No-ENrttv condtition (41) is non linear as shown in Figure 2. The curve lies below
the No-ENrRY condition of Chamberlinian competition as inspection of eqs. (37) and (42)
reveals. The solution for the rate of growth under monopolistic competition can be found
at the point of intersection of the NO-ENTRY curve (42) and the PREF curve (34), as
illustrated in Figure Z. Because of the non-linearity the explicit formula for g is not very
revealing.~~ However, it is evident that the economy grows faster the tougher competiti-
on is. If competition is relatively less tough as in the case of monopolistic competition,
relatively high profit margins attract more firms in long-run equilibrium. As a result
aggregate fixed costs, N~ rise and there is less labour available for production and RdcD
activity.
If consumers become more thrifty (decline in 6 or p), the PREF-line moves down-
wards and growth increases. An increase in the productivity of RBcD, an increase in the
elasticity of substitution (e), or a fall in fixed cost (n shifts the No-ENTRV curve upwards
in both models of competition, so that the growth rate rises. In all cases considered the
growth rate rises (falls), because the number of firms falls (rises). A change in the share
~t Thrre may he twu eyuilibrium insteaJ of onc in lhis ca~. If there aro lwo eyuilibrium solutíons thC
one with th~ lower growth retc is unstrble, Ixxau.ve it violatrs th~ DSDconJition of Novshrk anJ
Simncnschein (1987).12
of labour allocated in the X-sector (oL) leads to a proportionate change in the number of
linns undcr Chamherlinian compctition, and has no impact on the ratc ol growth. ln the
case of monopolistic competition the number of firms changes less than proportionate and
the growth rate is affected correspondingly.
Welfare implications
The consequences for welfare of the market solutions can be discussed by comparing
the outcomes with those of the planning approach. Inspection of equations ( 18) and (38)
reveals that under Chamberlinian competition the growth rate is equal to the optimal rate
of growth. However, the number of firms in the high-tech sector is too low under the
market solution. The reason for this deviation from the optimum is mark-up pricing in the
differentiated products sector. Because prices of differentiated goods do not reflect
marginal cost, households spend too little on differentiated products and too much on
traditional products (cf. Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). In the market solution relative prices do
not reflect marginal costs. In the planning approach commodities are implicitely priced at
their marginal cost, as can be shown easily. Denoting discounted marginal utilities of
commodities x and Y by respectively U~ and Uy central planning implies U~Uy - IIh ~
can be checked by differentiating instantaneous utility with respect to x and Y taking into
account equations (3) ,(4), (5) and (7). In contrast the market economy generates:
UxlUy - p,1Py - ((e -I)Ie)(IIh)
As labour allocated in the traditional sector is lower than in the centralized case, the
number of firms in market equilibrium will be less than in the planning approach. The
number of firms falls in the same proportion as the aggregate amount of labour in the X-
sector, so that the growth rate is not affected.
Under monopolistic competition the mark-up in the differentiated goods sector is
higher than under Chamberlinian competition. As a consequence, households demand less
of each differentiated product in relation to the amount of Y goods consumed. It should be
noted that the amount of labour in the Y-sector dces not depend on the mark-up in the
cases considet~ed. With zero profits betause of free entry in the differentiated goods sector
we get: Ly - aL. As a consequence the amount of labour in the X-sector dces not change
either. N(LX f L~ f~ is constant. However, because consumers want to consume less of
each differentiated product compared with Chamberlinian competition Lx should also
decline. The balance is struck by a larger number of firms in case of monopolistic
competition compared with Chamberlinian competition. Nevertheless, the number of firms
is still sub-optimal as follows from a comparison with the result of the planning approach.
13ecause RBr.D is now lower, the rate of growth is sub-0ptimal.
It is instructive to illustrate the result numerically. For this purpose the parameters of
the mcxiel will be given the following plausible values:13
0-0.OS.p-4.a-0.5.F -2
ï: - U. I f- I
The scale of the economy is set at L- IUO. As can be verified, with this set of parame-
ters the conditions for meaningful solutions given above are met. The results are
presented in Table I.









r(~) - 30 24
g(96) 10 10 7,6
L, l 2 1,64
L,. I 1 0,76
LY 33 ll3 50 50
N"~ 22 2!9 I2,5 14,7
~e integer prohlem is ignored for convenience.
It should be noted that the distortions of the optimum in both market solutions are due to
monopolistic price setting in the high-tech sector. There are no externalities, which should
be internalized. Leaming by doing is an in-house activity of firms, which is taken care of
in maximizing the value of the firm.
Conclusions
Toughness of competition is conducive to economic growth. If profit margins are
relatively low less firms will find a place in the market, so that the amount of labour
available for each firm is larger. Firms allocate a share of the additional labour to their
RBr.D division, which results in a higher rate of growth of efficiency in the differentiated
goods sector. The wage rate in the X-sector rises. Workers in the traditional goods sector
benefit to the same extent as the terms of trade move in favour of the Y-sector.
Under Chamberlinian competition the profit margin depends on the elasticity of
substitution between differentiated products. From a welfare point of view the rate of14
growth is then optimal, but the number of firms and products is too small. Welfaro
distortions are caused by the deviation of prices form marginal cost in the X-sector. As a
consequence, consumers spend too much on traditional products. However, the intertem-
poral trade-off between present and future consumption of differentiated products is not
affected by price setting in the high-tech sector. The situation is different when profit
margins depend on the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products as well as
on the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products and traditional products. In
the latter case the intertemporal optimality conditions are also affected by imperfect
competition in the X-sector. Therefore, under monopolistic competition the rate of
economic growth and the number of firms are both sub-optimal.
In the present model, welfare distortions only come from imperfect competition in the
high-tech sector. There are no externalities assumed. Introduction of knowledge spill-
overs between firms can easily be introduced, but complicate the analysis substantially.
The welfare implications are nevertheless clear. Firms will spend tcxi little on RBcD if
they can not appropriatc the tiill return of the investment.
Appendix
[n this appendix we derive the dynamic solution for the market economy with a given
number of firms, N. To simplify the exposition we take the output of the representative
good in the high-tech sector as the numéruire, so that p~ - I and ~ya - p. Our aim is to
derive a differential equation in L, by proper substitutions into the Ramsey equation (20).
Given our choice of the miméruire eqs. (28), (29) and (30) imply
~Lx-Fg-r (A.1)
I:rom cys. (2) -(4) and Ihc lirst ordcr conditions (22) -(25) il is wsy to dcrivc tmder lhc
condition of symmetry in the high-tech sector
- ~1-a e ~
LY a e -1 NLx
Substitution of eqs. (6) and (A.2) in the labour market relationship (7) results in
e-o L {A~ -L ~.
a(e -I) A ~ N
Combining (A.1) and (A.3) one gets
(A.2)
(A.3)
r - a(,-1)1 LX
. ~ ( ~ - fl (A.4)15
Logarithmic differentiation with respect to time of eqs. (26) and (28), given our
choice of the numéruire, results in K,~~y - p~pY -~,. Taking account of this result loga-
rithmical differentiation with respect to time of eq. (25) gives
pc P - (1 -a)g (A.5)
c
Substitution of eqs. (3), (4) and (5) into (2) and differentiating logarithmically with
respect to time yields
C - Qg r Lx C L (A.6)
X
Substitution of (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6) in the Ramsey rule results in the differential
equation
X-~ (e -a) r t(1 - a)1 A
L - ILap . (I -a) - J L~ -
p a(P-IJ e-a
~~a(p-1) ~ L f~ - B~ Lx (A.7)
p N p




Figure I: pQ , (~ -Q) ) P(I -a)
e -a
Figure II: p a t(1 -a) G e(1 -o)
e-a
is a degenerate solution at Lx - 0. For pa t(1 -a) 1 e(1 -o)~e -a the second solution
for Lx is unstable. Therefore, under perfect foresight economic agents will jump to this
solution. Only the stationary solution can be an equilibrium because any other solution
would lead to a negative LA. or to Lx larger than L. [n the case of Figure II with
pa ~(I -a) c c~(1 - a1~t~ a the second solution is stable. There is now a continumum of
initial values for L,. consistent with a convergent solution. As argued by Buiter (1984), the
stationarity property can be imposed in this case, because the system with one forward
looking variable and one root should not depend on "irrelevant" past values. Neverthe-
less, the chosen solution of the fastest convergence is arbitrary, as is every other
possibili[y. From an empirical point of view the picture shown Figure II is less likely to
emerge as it requires p c l.16
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